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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of normal accruals and 
discretionary accruals using the firms listed in the Chinese A-share Market. The results show that 
significant overpricing of discretionary accruals exists for individual investors and institutional 
investors, suggesting that they are both misled by the earnings management, while institutional 
investors are associated with significantly less overpricing. With respect to normal accruals, we 
find there is no evidence that institutional investors misprice normal accruals, while the individual 
investors overprice normal accruals. Our results suggest that institutional investors’ superiority in 
mitigating the mispricing of total accruals is mainly due to their accurate pricing of normal 
accruals, and the reason why institutional investors cannot fully eliminate mispricing of accruals 
is that they are partly misled by earnings management.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines the role of institutional investors in the pricing of normal accruals and 
discretionary accruals, and whether they are misled by earnings management. Sloan (1996) 
demonstrates that investors overestimate the persistence of accruals causing the accruals to be 
overpriced; he further proposes that the mispricing of accruals is due to earnings fixation by naïve investors (e.g., 
individual investors). Recent evidence suggests that even sophisticated participants of the stock market such as 
institutional investors, financial analysts and auditors also misprice the accruals (Ali et al., 2000; Bradshaw et al., 
2001; Collins et al., 2003), but institutional investors can significantly mitigate the extent of accruals’ mispricing 
(Collins et al., 2003; Barone and Magilke, 2009). However, how institutional investors mitigate accruals mispricing 
and why they cannot fully eliminate accruals mispricing is still not clear. To answer these questions, we extend prior 
research (e.g., Xie, 2001; Collins et al., 2003) by decomposing total accruals into discretionary accruals and normal 
accruals. This decomposing enables us to investigate separately the effects of investor sophistication on: (1) normal 
accruals, which represent the “natural attribute” of total accruals; and (2) discretionary accruals, which represent the 
outcome of managerial earnings management. By comparing the pricing efficiency of institutional investors on these 
two types of accruals, we can better comprehend their superiority in pricing accruals, and what prevents them from 
fully and accurately pricing the accruals.  
 
Following prior research (Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001; Beneish and Vargus, 2002), we use the Mishkin (1983) 
test to address our research questions. The Mishkin test provides a statistical comparison between accruals’ ability to 
predict one-year-ahead earnings (persistence) and investors’ valuation of accruals’ persistence. If the investors’ 
valuation of accruals’ persistence is higher than accruals’ persistence, then the overpricing of accruals is indicated. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we compare the pricing between discretionary accruals and normal accruals. 
Second, we examine whether the extent of discretionary mispricing differs between firms with high institutional 
ownership and firms with low institutional ownership. The extent of normal accruals’ mispricing difference is also 
T 
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examined. Third, we examine changes in institutional ownership in response to discretionary accruals and normal 
accruals. These analyses are based on the sample of listed Chinese (A-share) firms from 2001 and 2010. 
 
Our persistence tests reveal that the normal accruals are significantly more persistent than the discretionary 
accruals. This result provides evidence that the earnings management will lower the persistence of accruals. The 
results of the pricing test are as follows. 1) The mispricing of the discretionary is greater than normal accruals, 
indicating that the mispricing of total accruals is due largely to the earnings management. 2) With respect to normal 
accruals, we find there is no evidence that institutional investors misprice these accruals, while the individual 
investors overprice normal accruals; we conjecture that the institutional investors’ superiority to mitigate the 
mispricing of total accruals is mainly due to their accurate pricing of normal accruals. 3) Both individual investors 
and institutional investors significantly overprice discretionary accruals, while the extent of mispricing for 
institutional investors is significantly lower than that of individual investors; our findings indicate that the reason 
why institutional investors cannot fully eliminate accruals mispricing is that they are partly misled by the earnings 
management; 4) Institutional ownership changes are negatively related to accruals, indicating that institutional 
investors will sell stocks in response to high accruals. We also find that institutional investors are more sensitive to 
normal accruals than to discretionary accruals. 
 
Our study provides some of the first insights into which type of accruals institutional investors tend to 
misprice, and help us in better understanding the role of institutional investors in accruals’ mispricing. Taken 
together, our results support the naïve-investor hypothesis for the accruals anomaly, and show that earnings 
management is an important source of accruals mispricing for both individual investors and institutional investors in 
the context of the Chinese emerging capital market. Our results also provide useful information for institutional 
investor research, showing that the mitigating effect of institutional investors on accruals’ mispricing is mainly due 
to their accurate pricing of normal accruals, and that institutional investors cannot fully understand the more 
complex discretionary accruals. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant literature and develops our 
hypothesis. In section 3, we describe our samples and data. In section 4, we present our main results and discuss our 
findings. The summary and limitations are in the final sections. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1  The Mispricing of Accruals 
 
Accounting information plays a very important role in the capital market. However, Sloan (1996) finds that 
the market does not fully understand the information contained in the components of earnings (i.e., cash flow and 
accruals). Cash flow and accruals are different in the implication of future profitability; however, investors fail to 
understand this fact, so they overestimate the persistence of accruals, and therefore, overprice the accruals. A trading 
strategy that takes a long position of the low-accruals firms and a short position of the high-accruals firms can obtain 
a significant abnormal return in the following year. After Sloan (1996), a number of studies have examined the 
presence of an accruals anomaly (Thomas, 1999; Collins and Hribar, 2000; Bradshaw et al., 2001; Richardson et al., 
2006). Pincus et al. (2007) document the existence of the accruals in four countries: Australia, Canada, the UK and 
the U.S. Adamek and Kaserer (2006) provide evidence that the accrual anomaly is also present in Germany. Lev and 
Nissim (2006) show that the accruals anomaly still persists since Sloan (1996) found it. As to China, Li et al. (2011) 
documents the presence of accrual mispricing in China’s stock market. 
 
Several studies provide numerous explanations for the accruals anomaly. Fairfield et al. (2003) document 
that the accruals are more highly correlated with invested capital, so the lower persistence of accruals stems from the 
effect of growth on future profitability. Some research focuses on the component of total accruals, such as special 
items or inventory changes. Dechow and Ge (2006) find that investors cannot fully appreciate the transitory nature 
of special items and showed that the special items are a significant contributing factor to low persistence of earnings 
in low-accruals firms. Richardson et al. (2006) provide evidence that the lower persistence of accruals was primarily 
due to temporary accounting distortions. Zhang (2007) investigates the growth and persistence hypotheses for the 
accruals anomaly, concluding that it is due to the fundamental investment information contained in accruals. 
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Existing research also provides evidence that discretionary accruals are mispriced by investors. Teoh et al. 
(1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) provide evidence that accruals are managed upwards to increase earnings in the 
year prior to and in the year of initial public offerings or seasoned equity offerings, and in such, investors overprice 
these discretionary accruals. Xie (2001) documents that the market overprices the persistence of abnormal accruals 
and the results show that the abnormal returns to the abnormal accruals-based hedge portfolio is significantly larger 
than the abnormal returns to the normal accruals-based hedge portfolio. Pincus et al. (2007) provide similar evidence 
in a global setting. Thomas and Zhang (2002) find that inventory changes can explain the negative relationship 
between accruals and future returns. They conjecture that earnings management masks the future profitability 
reversals due to inventory changes. Discretionary accruals are the result of the managerial earnings management, 
while normal accruals are the result of the normal operation activities. Thus, current earnings are less likely to 
persist if they mainly stem from the discretionary accruals and it is difficult for investors to recognize managerial 
earnings management. Therefore, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1:  The mispricing of discretionary accruals is greater than that of normal accruals. 
 
2.2  Institutional Investors and Accruals Mispricing 
 
Prior research often characterized institutional investors as sophisticated investors who can better 
understand firm’s earnings component. Ke and Petroni (2004) find that transient institutional investors can predict a 
break in a string of consecutive quarterly earnings increase, thereby avoiding the forthcoming loss. They also 
provide evidence that institutional investors obtain information about forthcoming earnings breaks from managers 
through private communications. Jiambalvo et al. (2002) argue that institutional investors can better use both 
current-period information and non-earnings information to predict future earnings. Ali et al. (2004) find that 
changes in institutional ownership are related to abnormal returns at the time of the subsequent announcements of 
quarterly earnings, supporting that the institutional investors can trade based on information about forthcoming 
earnings. 
 
A large body of empirical research also provides evidence that higher institutional ownership will lead to 
stock prices reflecting more earning information. Ayers and Freeman (2003) show that the price of firms with high 
institutional investors incorporates future earnings earlier than other firms. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that 
institutional ownership can accelerate the future earnings news into prices. Collins et al (2003) show that firms with 
a high level of institutional ownership and a minimum threshold level of transient institutional investors have 
accruals that are more accurately priced. However, their research does not distinguish from where institutional 
investors’ superior ability comes. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) study the relationship between institutional ownership 
and the relative informational efficiency of price, and their results show that both the institutional shareholdings and 
institutional trading activity can make stock prices become more efficient. Yan and Zhang (2009) investigated short-
term institutional investors and found consistent results with the notion that short-term institutional investors are 
better informed, and that they also trade actively to exploit their informational advantage. Barone and Magilke 
(2009) find evidence that is consistent with predictions of the naïve investors hypothesis, and their results show that 
mispricing is significant for naïve investors, while sophisticated institutional investors are associated with a 
significant reduction in the mispricing of cash flow. Deng and Xu (2011) document that institutional investors have 
better stock selection ability in China. 
 
We focus on the pricing of normal accruals first. The normal accruals represent the adjustment of cash flow 
to earnings from the normal operational activities. Since institutional investors can better understand firms’ earning 
component (Ali et al., 2004; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Jiambalvo et al., 2002) and higher institutional ownership leads 
to stock prices that reflect more earning information (Ayers and Freeman, 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; 
Boehmer and Kelley, 2009; Yan and Zhang, 2009), we predict that the institutional investors can accurately price 
the persistence of normal accruals, while individual investors cannot accurately price the normal accruals. In such, 
we hypothesize: 
 
H2:  The normal accruals are overpriced for firms with low institutional ownership, while the normal accruals 
are accurately priced for firms with high institutional ownership. 
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Prior research studies sophisticated investors’ reaction to earnings management. Balsam et al. (2002) find 
that institutional investors play an important role in determining the timing of the market reaction to earnings 
management. Their results show that institutional investors can quickly respond to accruals management. They 
hypothesize that institutional investors have superior analytical skills, and can better decompose accruals into 
discretionary and normal components than individual investors. Another possibility is that the institutional investors 
have better information sources, such as conference calls and private conversations with management (Ke and 
Petroni, 2004), to allow them access to information that can help them to recognize earnings management more 
easily and/or quickly than individual investors. Therefore, we predict that institutional investors can better price the 
persistence of discretionary accruals than individual investors. However, the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and future earnings is more complex than the relationship between normal accruals and future earnings, so 
institutional investors may not fully eliminate the mispricing of accruals. This leads to our next hypothesis: 
 
H3:  The discretionary accruals are overpriced for both firms with low and high institutional ownership, while 
firms with high institutional ownership are associated with a significant reduction in this mispricing. 
 
Following Collins (2003), we examine whether the differential accrual mispricing between individual 
investors and institutional investors is due to the institutional investors’ trading based on accruals information. If the 
institutional investors are more sophisticated and better understand the accruals, then we expect the higher accruals 
(both discretionary accruals and normal accruals) will cause more institutional selling, making the accruals 
negatively related to the institutional ownership changes. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  The institutional ownership changes are negatively correlated with both the normal accruals and 
discretionary accruals. 
 
3.  DATA AND SAMPLE  
 
3.1  Sample Selection and Data Source 
 
We use all Chinese listed (A share) firms   from 2001 to - 2010 as the initial sample. Financial statement 
data are collected from the CSMAR China Stock Market Financial Statements Database, return data are obtained 
from the CSMAR China Stock Market Trading Database, and institutional investor ownership data are collected 
from Wind Financial Database. Our sample begins in 2001 because the new accounting standard was released 
during that year. We exclude the financial firms (with an industry code of “I”) because they have a different kind of 
financial statement.  
 
3.2  Measurement of the variables 
 
Similar to Collins (2003), we use the categorical classification instead of using a continuous measure to 
enhance the power of our tests. Firms with zero institutional ownership are grouped into the low institutional 
ownership subsample (hereafter “LIO”), and firms with institutional ownership higher than median are grouped into 
the high institutional ownership subsample (hereafter “HIO”). The final samples are 7,813 firm-years, with 2,854 
firm-years in the HIO subsample and 4,959 firm-years in the LIO subsample. 
 
We use the cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones (1991) Model that was presented by Defond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) to estimate normal accruals and discretionary accruals: 
 
0 1 2/ (1/ ) ( ) / ( / )t t t t t t t t tAccruals TA a TA a REV REC TA a PPE TA e                                       (1) 
 
where accrualst is the difference between net income before extraordinary items and net cash flow from operating 
activities; TAt is the average total asset in year t; ΔREVt is the change in sales revenues between year t-1 and year t; 
ΔREVt is the change in account receivables between year t-1 and year t; and PPEt is gross property, plant and 
equipment. Following Xie (2001), we denote the predicted values of accruals from the Modified Jones Model as 
normal accruals (NAcc) and the residuals as discretionary accruals (DAcc). 
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Table 1: Main Variable Definition 
Variables Definition and Measurement 
Earn Net income before extraordinary items, scaled by average total asset 
CFO Net cash flow from operating activities, scaled by average total asset 
Accruals Accruals =Earn - CFO 
NAcc Normal accruals, the predicted values of accruals from the Modified Jones (1991) Model 
DAcc Discretionary accruals, the residuals from the Modified Jones Model 
IO Institutional Ownership=Sum of the institutional ownership 
AR Annual, size-adjusted, buy-and-hold returns from the beginning of the fifth month after the firm’s 
fiscal year-end. 
BM Book-to-market ratio, the book value to market value.  
Size Natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample and the LIO/HIO subsamples. Similar to Xie 
(2001) and Collins (2003), average accruals are negative (-0.017) and the discretionary accruals are near zero 
(0.003). Comparing the financial characteristics of firms between LIO and HIO, we find that the HIO subsample has 
better performance than the LIO subsample. For example, the earnings of the HIO subsample is 0.08, which is 
higher than the earnings of the LIO subsample of 0.018; the HIO subsample also has more cash flow (0.086) than 
the LIO subsample (0.042), as with the accruals. However, the magnitude of normal accruals does not differ 
significantly across the two subsamples (-0.021 and -0,018). In the HIO subsample, the average institutional 
ownership is 21.261%, which is far below the 63.6% reported by Collins (2003). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables 
Full Sample 
Mean 
LIO 
Mean 
HIO 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Earnt 0.041 0.018 0.08 0.081 -0.307 0.012 0.038 0.072 0.319 
CFOt 0.058 0.042 0.086 0.102 -0.272 0.006 0.054 0.111 0.383 
Accrualst -0.017 -0.024 -0.006 0.109 -0.368 -0.071 -0.021 0.028 0.388 
DAcct 0.003 -0.002 0.012 0.106 -0.439 -0.046 0.002 0.049 0.471 
NAcct -0.020 -0.021 -0.018 0.028 -0.126 -0.038 -0.023 -0.006 0.135 
ARt+1 0.021 0.031 0.002 0.342 -1.196 -0.16 -0.038 0.117 1.704 
IOt 7.767 0.000 21.261 13.904 0 0 0 10.681 64.041 
BMt 0.365 0.335 0.428 0.284 -0.726 0.191 0.317 0.506 1.393 
Sizet 14.909 14.419 15.757 1.04 12.818 14.209 14.74 15.504 17.975 
Notes: 
1: Full sample consists of 7,813 firm-years from 2001 to 2010, 4,959 firm-years for the HIO subsample, and 2,854 firm-years for 
the LIO subsample. 
2: We do the 1% winsorization to the data to smooth the effect of outliers.  
3: Statistics’ significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively (two-tail). 
 
4.  RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
 
4.1  Institutional Ownership and Accruals Mispricing 
 
Following Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), and Beneish & Vargus (2002), we use the framework proposed by 
Mishkin (1983) to test our hypotheses H1~H3. The Mishkin (1983) test is a two-stage rational expectations 
procedure, where the null hypothesis is that the investors rationally price the persistence of earnings components. 
Equation (2) is a forecasting equation to measure the persistence of the earnings component for predicting the one-
year-ahead earnings. Equation (3) is a pricing equation to estimate the valuation of persistence that the investors 
implicitly assign to the earnings component embedded in the stock price. Mispricing is indicated if the persistence of 
accruals is significantly different from the investors’ perception of persistence for accruals. Specifically, following 
Beneish and Vargus (2002), we decompose total accruals into four parts and estimate the equations below: 
 
1 0 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t tEarn LDAcc LNAcc HDAcc HNAcc CFO                                                (2) 
 
* * * * * *
1 0 1 1 0 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t t tAR Earn LDAcc LNAcc HDAcc HNAcc CFO z                 
             (3) 
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where: 
 
LDAcc=discretionary accruals if firm is in LIO subsamples, and 0 otherwise. 
LNAcc=normal accruals if firm is in LIO subsamples, and 0 otherwise. 
HDAcc=discretionary accruals if firm is in HIO subsamples, and 0 otherwise. 
HNAcc=normal accruals if firm is in HIO subsamples, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In Equations (2) and (3), the coefficients β1 and β2 capture the persistence of discretionary accruals and 
normal accruals for the LIO subsample, while the coefficients β3 and β4 capture the persistence of discretionary 
accruals and normal accruals for the HIO subsample.  β*1 and β
*
2 capture the investors’ perception of persistence for 
discretionary accruals and normal accruals in the LIO subsample, while β*3 and β
*
4 capture the investors’ perception 
of persistence for discretionary accruals and normal accruals in the HIO subsample. We estimate Equations (2) and 
(3) jointly using a two-stage iterative generalized nonlinear least-squares procedure. In the first stage, Equations (2) 
and (3) are estimated without imposing any constraints; in the second stage, Equations (2) and (3) are estimated after 
imposing the rational pricing constraints to test whether the investors’ perception of persistence (e.g., β*1) are 
significantly different from the persistence of earnings components (e.g., β1) obtained from the first stage. 
 
For the LIO subsample, we expect that both discretionary accruals and normal accruals will be 
overestimated, which means the valuation of persistence that investors implicitly assign to discretionary accruals and 
normal accruals are higher than the persistence of discretionary accruals and normal accruals for predicting one-
year-ahead earnings (β1<β
*
1 and β2<β
*
2). For the HIO subsample, we expect both discretionary accruals and normal 
accruals will be accurately priced, which means the valuation of persistence that investors implicitly assign to 
discretionary accruals and normal accruals are similar to the persistence of discretionary accruals and normal 
accruals for predicting one-year-ahead earnings (β3≈β
*
3 and β4≈β
*
4). According to Collins (2003), the ratio of 
persistence to perceived persistence (e.g. β1/β
*
1) can be used as an efficiency ratio to compare the pricing efficiency 
between subsamples. If one component of accruals is mispriced by both the LIO subsample and the HIO subsample, 
we can use this ratio to compare the extent of the mispricing. If so, we predict that the ratio of HIO is bigger than the 
ratio of LIO, which means HIO can better price the persistence of accruals component. 
 
Table 3: Mishkin Test for Market Pricing Results from Equation (2) and (3) 
Earnt+1=β0+β1LDAcct+β2LNAcct+β3HDAcct+β4HNAcct+β5CFOt +εt                                    (2) 
ARt+1=δ0+δ1[Earnt+1-β
*
0-β
*
1LDAcct-β
*
2LNAcct-β
*
3HDAcct-β
*
4HNAcct-β
*
5CFOt]+zt  (3) 
Panel A: 
 
 
Parameter Estimate 
 Test of Equality of Forecasting and 
Pricing Coefficients 
Independent Variable 
 
Forecasting 
Regression 
Pricing 
Regression 
 
Likelihood ratio p-value 
LDAcc  
0.337*** 
(30.21) 
0.962*** 
(13.45) 
 β1=β
*
1 74.54 0.000 
LNAcc  
0.563*** 
(15.46) 
0.971*** 
(4.89) 
 β2=β
*
2 4.09 0.043 
HDAcc  
0.448*** 
(28.36) 
0.86*** 
(9.65) 
 β3=β
*
3 20.71 0.000 
HNAcc  
0.522*** 
(13.08) 
0.486** 
(2.25) 
 β4=β
*
4 0.03 0.870 
CFO  
0.528*** 
(47.3) 
0.782*** 
(12.52) 
 β5=β
*
5 15.94 0.000 
Panel B: Coefficients Test:  
  Test Statistic p-value     
Is the persistence of LIO/HIO’s normal accruals different from the persistence of LIO/HIO’s discretionary accruals? 
β1=β2  37.04 0.000     
β3=β4  3.42 0.064     
Is the pricing parameter of LIO/HIO’s normal accruals different from the pricing parameter of LIO/HIO’s discretionary accruals? 
β*1=β
*
2  0.00 0.963     
β*3=β
*
4  2.92 0.088     
Is the persistence of normal accruals different from the persistence of discretionary accruals in LIO? 
β1/β
*
1=β2/β
*
2  3.43 0.064     
Are the efficiency ratios of discretionary accruals different between LIO and HIO? 
β1/β
*
1=β3/β
*
3  10.27 0.001     
Notes: Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively (two-tail). 
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The results of the Mishkin test are presented in Table 3. The persistence of discretionary accruals is 
significantly lower than the persistence of normal accruals (β1=0.337<β2=0.563, p=0.000) for the LIO subsample, as 
with the HIO subsample (β3=0.448 < β4=0.522, p=0.064), which indicate that the persistence of discretionary 
accruals is lower than normal accruals. The pricing parameter of normal accruals and discretionary accruals for the 
LIO subsample are not different (β*1=0.962 ≈ β
*
2=0.971, p=0.963), indicating that the individual investors may not 
distinguish the difference of persistence between normal accruals and discretionary accruals, as with the accruals 
and cash flow. For the HIO subsample, the situation is quite different. The pricing parameters are different 
(β*3=0.860, β
*
4=0.486, p=0.088), suggesting that the institutional investors may distinguish the difference of 
persistence. However, explaining these results must be done carefully, because β*3 is higher than β
*
4, which means 
that the institutional investors feel the discretionary accruals are more persistent than the normal accruals. We 
conjecture that the institutional investors may fully understand the implication of future earnings embedded in the 
normal accruals but they are misled by the earnings management, so that their valuation of persistence for 
discretionary accruals is higher. 
 
Next, we shift our focus to the comparison of accruals’ persistence with respect to future earnings and the 
investors’ perceived persistence. In Panel A of Table 3, the persistence of normal accruals (β2) is 0.563, while the 
investors’ perceived persistence (β*2) is 0.971, and β2=β
*
2 is rejected, suggesting that the normal accruals are 
significantly overpriced in the LIO subsample. For the HIO subsample, we have β4=0.522 and β
*
4=0.486 but β4=β
*
4 
is not rejected, suggesting that the normal accruals are not mispriced in the HIO subsample. All in all, the result that 
LIO’s normal accruals are mispriced and HIO’s normal accruals are not mispriced fully support our hypothesis H2, 
indicating that the institutional investors can better price the normal accruals.  
 
The pricing tests of discretionary accruals yield the following. For the LIO subsample, the persistence of 
discretionary accruals (β1) is 0.337, which is significantly lower than the investors’ perceived persistence 
(β*1=0.962), and β1=β
*
1 is rejected, suggesting that the discretionary accruals are significantly overpriced in the LIO 
subsample. For the HIO subsample, β3=0.448, β
*
3=0.86 and β3=β
*
3 are rejected, suggesting that there exists 
significant discretionary accruals overpricing in the HIO subsample. This result is slightly different from the results 
obtained by Collins (2003); their results show that there is no significant mispricing of total accruals for the High 
Institutional Ownership firms. To gain further insight about the mispricing of discretionary accruals, we compare the 
pricing efficiency between LIO and HIO. The pricing efficiency ratio of discretionary accruals for 
HIO(β3/β
*
3=0.521) is significantly higher (p=0.001) than that of LIO (β1/β*1=0.350), indicating that although the 
HIO subsample also overestimates the discretionary accruals, the level of the overestimation is much lower than that 
of the LIO subsample. Thus, our hypothesis H3 is supported.  
 
Finally, we compare the mispricing of the normal accruals and discretionary accruals. For the LIO 
subsample, the pricing efficiency ratio of discretionary accruals (β1/β
*
1=0.350) is significantly lower than normal 
accruals (β2/β
*
2=0.580); for the HIO subsample, the discretionary accruals are mispriced, while the normal accruals 
are accurately priced. Taken together, the results show that the mispricing of the discretionary accruals is greater 
than the mispricing of normal accruals, supporting our hypothesis H1, and indicating that the accruals’ mispricing is 
due largely to the earnings management. 
 
4.2  Institutional Investors’ Trading Behavior in Response to Normal Accruals and Discretionary 
Accruals 
 
To further examine whether the differential accrual mispricing between the LIO and HIO subsamples is due 
to the institutional investors’ trading behavior based on accruals information, we investigate the relationship 
between changes in institutional ownership from year t-1 to year t and the accruals at year t-1. If institutional 
investors can understand the accruals’ future earnings implications, which means high accruals related to future 
earnings reversal, they will sell stocks with high accruals. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between changes 
in institutional ownership and last year’s accruals. Following Collins (2003), we use Equations (4) and (5) to test our 
hypothesis, H4. In Equation (4), C_IO represents the institutional ownership changes from year t-1 to year t. The 
control variables include Book-to-Market ratio, size and industry dummies. Other variables are as defined 
previously. We decompose total accruals into discretionary accruals and normal accruals in Equation (5) to see 
whether the institutional investors have a different response to different types of accruals. 
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0 1 1_ *t tC IO a a Accruals Control                                                 (4) 
 
0 1 1 2 1_ * *t t tC IO a a DAcc a NAcc Control                                           (5) 
 
Table 4: Regressions of Changes in Institutional Ownership on Accruals 
C_IOt=a0+a1*Accrualst-1+ΣControl+ε                (4) 
C_IOt=a0+a1*DAcct-1+a2*NAcct-1+ΣControl+ε (5) 
 Regression (4)  Regression (5) 
Variable Estimate T value  Estimate T value 
Intercept 0.938*** 15.505  0.935*** 15.436 
Accrualst-1 -0.092*** -2.666    
DAcc t-1    -0.081** -2.297 
NAcc t-1    -0.309* -1.914 
BM t-1 0.046*** 3.468  0.042*** 3.047 
Size t-1 -0.06*** -16.329  -0.06*** -16.308 
F value 17.01***   16.38***  
Adj-R2 0.143   0.143  
Notes: 
1: C_IO is the changes in institutional ownership, equal to IOt minus IOt-1. 
2: Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively (two-tail). 
 
Table 4 reports the result from estimating Equations (4) and (5). Coefficient estimates of accruals, 
discretionary accruals and normal accruals are all significantly negative, indicating that institutional investors will 
sell stocks in response to high accruals, which support our hypothesis H4. Additionally, recall that results from 
Table 3 show that the persistence of normal accruals is higher than discretionary accruals, but the magnitude of 
DAcc’s coefficient (a 1=-0.081) in Equation (5) is smaller than NAcc’s coefficient (a 2=-0.309), which shows that the 
institutional investors have a greater response to normal accruals than to discretionary accruals. This result is 
consistent with the notion that the institutional investors are not always fully sophisticated and they also could be 
misled by the earnings management.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines the association between investor sophistication and the mispricing of discretionary 
accruals and normal accruals using a sample of listed Chinese (A-Share) firms from 2001 to 2010. By explicitly 
decomposing total accruals into normal accruals, which come from the normal activities of the firm, and 
discretionary accruals, which come from the managerial earnings management, we are able to investigate the 
different responses made by investors to these accruals. Following prior research, we employ the Mishkin (1983) 
test of rational expectation to empirically test whether the investors rationally price the persistence of normal 
accruals and discretionary accruals. The results show that: 1) the mispricing of discretionary accruals is more severe 
than the mispricing of normal accruals; 2) for normal accruals, the institutional investors accurately price the normal 
accruals, while the individual investors overprice the normal accruals; 3) for discretionary accruals, both 
institutional investors and individual investors overestimate the discretionary accruals, while institutional investors 
are associated with a significantly smaller overpricing; and 4) changes in institutional ownership are more related to 
the normal accruals rather than the discretionary accruals, showing that institutional investors cannot fully see 
through earnings management. In sum, our findings support the naïve-investor hypothesis for the accruals anomaly, 
as sophisticated institutional investors mitigate the mispricing of both discretionary accruals and normal accruals. 
We also find that institutional investors are partly misled by earnings management. 
 
 
This paper contributes to accruals anomaly research by providing more evidence of the effect of investor 
sophistication on different components of the accruals. In addition, we show that earnings management is an 
important source of accruals mispricing for both individual investors and institutional investors. Our findings also 
have implications for institutional investor research. Although prior research has documented the fact that 
institutional investors can mitigate accruals’ mispricing, we provide more direct evidence about the edge of 
institutional investors’ superiority in the Chinese stock market: namely, that they can understand the normal accruals 
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but they cannot fully understand the discretionary accruals from earnings management, which are more complicated 
than normal accruals. 
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